Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance

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Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance
(with Emmanuel Saez), American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2(2): 85-114, 2010.

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