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Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance

July 19, 2010/in Published Papers, Taxation of Individuals

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Tags: Taxation of Individuals
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/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/clear.png 0 0 Academic Web Pages /wp-content/uploads/2018/09/clear.png Academic Web Pages2010-07-19 00:00:002021-05-08 15:17:26Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance
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